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Pré-Publication, Document De Travail Année : 2014

Who's favored by evaluative voting? An experiment conducted during the 2012 French presidential election

Résumé

Under evaluative voting, the voter freely grades each candidate on a numerical scale, with the winning candidate being determined by the sum of the grades they receive. This paper compares evaluative voting with the two-round system, reporting on an experiment, conducted during the 2012 French presidential election, which attracted 2,340 participants. Here we show that the two-round system favors “exclusive” candidates, that is candidates who elicit strong feelings, while evaluative rules favor “inclusive” candidates, that is candidates who attract the support of a large span of the electorate. These differences are explained by two complementary reasons : the opportunity for the voter to support several candidates under evaluative voting rules, and the specific pattern of strategic voting under the two-round voting rule.
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Dates et versions

hal-00803024 , version 2 (20-03-2013)
hal-00803024 , version 1 (03-12-2014)

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Antoinette Baujard, Frédéric Gavrel, Herrade Igersheim, Jean-François Laslier, Isabelle Lebon. Who's favored by evaluative voting? An experiment conducted during the 2012 French presidential election. 2014. ⟨hal-00803024v1⟩
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